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1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is to argue that Moore’s paradox stands for Essential Indexicality because it occurs 
only when self-reference appears, and thus, for the case of Moore’s paradox, to contend that it is not 
possible to construct a case of the Frege counterpart that Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever assert as a 
counterexample to John Perry’s Essential Indexical. 
In their recent book, The Inessential Indexical: On the Philosophical Insignificance of Perspective 
and the First Person (Cappelen and Dever 2013), Cappelen and Dever show that there is opacity in the 
indexical in the case of behavior explanation, but exactly the same kind of opacity between the co-
referring expressions also holds in the third person case. They argue that the opacity in the case of 
indexical does not necessarily hold the special status of the indexicality (or first-person) because of the 
more general latter opacity. According to them, Perry’s Essential Indexical, contrary to its name, does 
not address the nature of indexical but suggests that there is a failure of truth-preserving substitution 
between the indexical and their co-referring expressions in attitude-context. Because, in those cases, the 
difference between one sentence and the other is, after all, a difference in the cases of Frege’s puzzle. 
In the case where the Essential Indexical is considered to have emerged, they claim that it is possible to 
present a counterpart (Frege Counterpart) that is the same in all respects except that it occurs between 
two co-referring expressions, not between the indexical and its co-referring expressions. 
Cappelen and Dever write that they provide (and can provide) the Frege Counterpart to all possible 
Perry-style cases that Essential Indexicals are present, but I think there is a case they haven't dealt with 
yet. This is the case of Moore's Paradox, which many philosophers thought is the example of the first-
person personality (e.g., Moran 1997). Moore’s paradox is widely regarded as a typical example of the 
peculiarity of the first-person, but curiously, they did not address Moore’s paradox in their discussions 
that deny the philosophical significance of the first-person view. 
Against their thesis, I will contend that the indexical (or first-person) still seems to have a special 
status, based on Moore’s Paradox. When self-reporting on belief attribution, it sounds strange to say 
“p” and then say, “I don’t believe p.” This paradoxical situation only occurs when one uses a sentence 
with the first-person indexical that reports his attribution of belief in p. With my analysis of Moore’s 
paradox presented in this paper, we will see Moore’s paradox only happens with self-reference and then 
the inability to remove the indexical or first-person perspectives. If Moore’s paradox does not occur 
without self-reference, the case of Moore’s paradox is a failure of substitution that occurs only when 
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the indexical is involved even if it is a failure of truth-preserving substitutions between co-referring 
expressions. I will argue, in the case of Moore’s paradoxical absurdity, there is no Frege Counterpart, 
such as a failure to replace between co-referring expressions where the same absurdity is a problem. In 
the end, I will conclude this suggests the peculiarity and irremovability of the first-person view. 
 
2. Preliminaries: Perry’s Messy Shopper & the Problem of Essential Indexical 
 
Many philosophers believe that John Perry’s monumental article “The Problem of the Essential 
Indexical” (Perry 1979/2000) showed this: it convincingly argues that some beliefs, such as self-
locating belief, that use indexical to refer themselves, have some conceptual element that is not 
explained only by its propositional content.  
 Let us consider two men along Perry who have almost similar belief systems. The situation is 
this: 
 
They believed that “one of us is making a mess” and “anyone who makes a mess should 
stop making the mess.” In fact, one of them, John Perry, bought perforated sugar sacks, 
so he unwittingly puts it in a shopping cart and wanders around. Based on their 
observations, they believed that the shopper with holey sugar bags is making a mess. No 
one stopped at those beliefs alone. Looking around, they found out that “John Perry is 
making a mess.” Then one person stopped the cart. 
 
If the situation is the above, their belief systems would eventually be the same. However, what do you 
find out that if one person stopped making a mess, why would it be? Perhaps, the person who stopped 
would have stopped because he thought he was John Perry. Without it, he would not have reached the 
point where the messer had to stop and would still be making messes. Observations like this seem to 
make it difficult to regard belief-attribution as merely a simple binary relation between propositions and 
epistemic subjects, regardless of relations to any referential element. Consider two cases of a simple 
binary relation between propositions and subjects, de re relation and de dicto relation. 
In the case with de re relation between propositions and subjects, there is no distinction between 
the relation of the subject with “the shopper with holey sugar bags making a mess” and the relation of 
the subject with “John Perry is making a mess.” If so, how can we explain the case why the mess-
stopping event occurred when he had the latter belief? At first, Perry did not consider “The shopper 
with holey sugar bags making a mess” as the proposition about himself. After believing that “John Perry 
is making a mess,” he regards “John Perry is making a mess” as the proposition about himself, and then 
he could conclude that "John Perry should stop." 
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Since John Perry stopped when he came to the latter belief, one could expect to explain this 
situation if the subject is related to the proposition in de dicto fashion where these beliefs can be 
distinguished naturally. However, if we are dealing with the case de dicto here, Perry believes in both 
beliefs at the same time but does not have the belief that I am making a mess. So, if Perry does not 
believe in “I’m a shopper with perforated sugar bags” or “I’m John Perry,” he cannot draw conclusions 
like “I should stop” from the first two beliefs. After all, de dicto relation is not a solution to this situation 
and must be appealed to the indexicality. 
In both approaches, we do not seem to be able to explain this situation without appealing to 
something like “what I regard as a proposition about myself” or “what I regard as content about 
myself.” In the end, the idea that this belief is de dicto or de re relation to the proposition does not seem 
to explain sufficiently the messy shopper case because it does not reflect the difference between the 
case with and without the indexicality. 
In addition, if John Perry says, “I made a mess,” he expresses that he believes in a Russellian 
proposition <John Perry, making a mess>. But the other believes that same Russellian proposition, 
expressed by the belief report “John Perry has made a mess.” Naturally, those who believe in the same 
proposition and make claims about it, but who are not John Perry, will hold it is false that “I make a 
mess.” The proposition corresponding to this man’s claim “I make a mess” is not about John Perry, but 
about himself and is therefore false. If so, the sentence “I make a mess” does not seem to identify some 
particular proposition. This shows that the belief report, such as “I believe I make a mess,” does not 
have enough information that it is a belief-report on some particular proposition. 
Obviously, the propositional content of the beliefs shared by the two men in our example seems 
to be the same, but there seems to be a difference in the way in which the subject is related to 
propositional content. According to Perry, one breakthrough in solving this problem is to provide an 
explanation for it. In other words, it explains that any belief in the same proposition can be in a different 
state of belief if it is believed in a different way. 
Anyone can believe the proposition, <John Perry, making a mess> but only John Perry can have 
a state of belief that states, “I made a mess.” When we have this type of belief in ourselves, we say that 
we have an indexical or de se belief. Because of that, he would have stopped making a mess. 
According to de re relation approach or the Russell propositional approach so far, we have the 
same belief in both cases when the indexical is replaced by a co-referring expression, just as when 
indexical has included in belief. However, when we have belief using the indexical, we have belief by 
means of some particular way, that is, an indexical way. If such indexicals are indispensable to describe 
some propositional attitude we have correctly, then the indexical used in that case can be called an 
Essential Indexical, and the phenomenon that emerges is called an Essential Indexicality. 
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3. Cappelen and Dever: No Essential Indexical or Indexicality 
 
Perry, discussed in Section 2, contended that in the Self-Locating Belief, belief acquired by using 
Indexicals that directs believer himself, there is a conceptual element that is not explained solely by its 
propositional content. For the sake of understanding, consider the following example: 
 
Let us modify the example of the messy shopper case. Suppose John Perry forgot that his 
old name was Jack the Ripper, and this time it's the name tag that says Jack the Ripper, 
not sugar, that spilled over to the supermarket. He can look around and believe that “Jack 
the Ripper is making a mess,” and at the same time, believe that “I am not making a mess.” 
 
If I understood Perry correctly, given this situation, I assure he would argue that “John Perry” in the 
above example would not have stopped making a mess because he was no awareness that “Jack the 
Ripper is me.” For example, in the case above where John Perry believes that “I’m John Perry,” if John 
Perry had believed “John Perry is making a mess,” he would have stopped making the mess right away. 
In other words, “I,” “Jack the Ripper,” and “John Perry” are all co-referring expressions, but the only 
valid ones in explanation for not-stopping are “I” and “John Perry.” The other pairs of co-referring 
terms, “Jack the Ripper” and “I” cannot be substituted in this explanation. 
 There is an opacity that occurs in indexicals, as in the case described above, but even in the 
third person case, an opacity between co-referring expressions seems to be established. Suppose 
someone who watched the case believed that "I'll have to find Jack the Ripper and stop him making the 
mess." However, this person does not seem to believe that "I’ll have to find John Perry and stop him 
making a mess," which replaced “Jack the Ripper” with the co-referring term “John Perry” in the above 
statement.  
Cappelen and Dever point out that the more general latter (above third-person case) holds, so 
that opacity in the case of indexicals does not necessarily hold the special status of indexical (or first-
person) (Cappelen & Dever 2013, 61). They argue that the latter-type case can be presented for each of 
the cases that Perry and other philosophers believe that the Essential Indexical appears. That is, they 
present a failure of truth-preserving substitution case (Frege Counterpart), which differs only in that it 
occurs between two co-referring expressions, not between the indexical and its co-referring expressions, 
compared to the Perry-type case. As such, they argue that Perry's the problem of Essential Indexical 
eventually turned out to be Frege's puzzle. Originally, Frege distinguished sense (Sinn) from reference 
(Bedeutung) because he thought that the cognitive significance in a sentence or propositional attitude 
was not purely determined by the referential content of the expression. 
Thus, according to Cappelen and Dever, Perry's Essential Indexicality is not, as opposed to its 
name suggests, the essentiality of the indexical, but rather an indication of the impossibility of truth-
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preserving substitution between the indexical and its co-referring expression in attitude-context. 
Because, in those cases, the difference between one sentence and the other is only the difference that 
emerged in the cases of Frege’s puzzle. So they argue that it is possible to present Frege Counterparts, 
which are the same in all respects but generally occur between co-referring expressions, not only 
between indexicals and their co-referring expressions. 
In my opinion, they wisely pointed out the essential indexicality implies the failure of truth-
preserving substitutions, and the failure of truth-preserving substitutions does not imply the essential 
indexicality, but rather imply the opacity in attitude-contexts in general. This is correct. Also, it is 
correct that they found out that the basis for advocating the Indexical Opacity in Perry's examples can, 
at the same time, be the basis for advocating General Opacity. Therefore, to present a case where 
Cappelen and Dever’s arguments fail, I will show that there is a special opacity that only occurs in cases 
where indexical are used. In other words, if I can present a special case of indexicality that cannot be 
regarded as a failure of truth-preservative substitution between common co-referring expressions they 
call Frege Counterpart, it would be possible for me to present a counter-argument for them. 
However, to avoid unnecessary misunderstandings, it is advisable to point out that the problem 
of Essential Indexical and the problem of Essential Indexicality that Cappelen and Dever regard as one 
problem and are used interchangeably are different but closely related. If I have understood Perry 
correctly, as I have already mentioned, Perry's central claims can be summarized as follows: 
 
We do not seem to be able to explain this situation without appealing to something like 
the proposition about myself or the content about myself. If an indexical is indispensable 
to describe any propositional attitude we have properly, the indexical used in that case can 
be called an Essential Indexical, and the phenomenon that emerges is called an Essential 
Indexicality. (p.3) 
 
Can indexicality be expressed only as indexicals? In Perry's messy shopper's case, if John Perry 
regarded the name "John Perry" as something about himself, the belief that "John Perry created a mess" 
is John Perry's self-belief, and that belief does not necessarily have to be expressed using indexical. The 
Essential Indexicality can appear without the Essential Indexical. 
In conclusion, the essential indexicals are the most typical case of Essential Indexicality, but 
the Essential Indexicality can occur without the essential indexical. In other words, I do not need 
indexical “I,” although I need indexicality to regard a proposition or sentence as something about 
myself. 
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4. Moore’s Paradox: What Cappelen and Dever did not consider 
 
Moore’s paradox can be seen as an emblem for peculiarities in the ﬁrst-person point of 
view, speciﬁcally how the possibilities for thinking and talking about oneself are 
systematically different from the possibilities of thinking and talking about other people. 
(Moran 1997, 143) 
 
Cappelen and Dever seem to write they provided (and can provide) the Frege Counterpart for every 
possible situation in which Perry claims the Essential Indexicality appears, but, I think, there are 
situations they have not yet realized. In some special circumstances, even without an apparent 
contradiction manifested at the proposition or sentence level, there seems to be a problem where having 
a certain type of belief-ascription is as contradictory. This is the case of Moore's Paradox, which many 
philosophers thought was an example of the peculiarities of first-person, independent of the problem of 
Essential Indexicality. In this section, as I analyze Moore’s Paradox, I will present an example of the 
Essential Indexicality opposition to Cappelen and Dever. Further, the analysis in this section will also 
clarify the relationship between Moore’s Paradox and the problem of the Essential Indexicality. 
Let us compare “p, but someone does not believe p" and "p, but I don’t believe p." George 
Edward Moore finds out that the latter is a paradox. This can be called a paradox because it appears to 
be a kind of <p and not p> even though the truth condition of <p> in the latter sentence and the truth 
condition of <I do not believe p> are completely different. However, we do not feel any absurdity about 
the third person sentence “p, but someone does not believe p.” The fact that p and the fact that someone 
believes p is clearly different. When no other conditions are given to us, the fact that p is true does not 
allow us to find a logical (the former logically implies the latter) or rational reason for someone to 
believe it. However, when the subject of the sentence is "I," the moment when we consider "p," it sounds 
absurd that "I don’t believe p." This distinction between third-person and first-person cases suggests 
that there is the peculiarity of the first-person view.  
I contend this peculiarity has to do with the Essential Indexicality. Let us consider how Moore's 
paradox reveals the Essential Indexicality. 
 
Moore: “p, but I don’t believe p.” 
Me: "p, but Moore does not believe p." 
 
At first glance, the two assertions seem to express our belief in the same proposition, but why is it that 
it seems paradoxical or absurd that only one, Moore's statement, even though it does not have a formal 
paradox? To explain the difference between the two, I need to note the commonality with propositional 
attitude-explanatory situations that Perry sees the essential indexicality. In this situation, Moore 
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considers himself a person who does not believe in <p> by using the indexical "I," while I see Moore 
as a person who does not believe in <p>. To express this very point, Moore uses the indexical “I” to 
differentiate his belief-ascription from my belief-ascription that uses a sentence without the “I.” 
 With this motivation in mind, I shall note Cappelen and Dever's Frege Counterpart, which 
opposes Perry’s the inessential indexicality: 
 
Frege Counterpart is a case like the original one in all relevant respect except that the 
substitution failure involves names instead of indexicals. (Cappelen & Dever 2013, 61) 
 
Here, the essence of my claim that Moore's paradox can be a counterexample to Cappelen and Dever is 
that Moore's paradox only occurs with self-reference. If Moore's paradox does not occur without self-
reference, then even if the case of Moore's paradox is clearly a failure of truth-preserving substitutions 
between co-referring expressions, it is a failure of substitution that only occurs if an indexical expression 
is involved.  
 What I should clearly show for my readers is that the absurdity of Moore's paradox is 
inextricably linked to self-reference. The use of self-referential expressions by us does not lead to 
Moore's paradox. Instead, Moore's paradox occurs only when (loosely speaking) the listener knows that 
he or she speaks about himself, that is when self-reference occurs. I shall begin the analysis from: 
 
(a) Moore: “p, but I don’t believe p.” 
 
When Moore utters the above sentence, we will have the following belief-report about Moore, and we 
will feel Moore-paradoxical absurdity. 
 
(b) Moore believes p, but Moore does not believe he believes p. 
Moore's self-report: I believe p, but I don't believe I believe p. 
 
However, what if this report is done without indexicals? 
 
(c) Moore believes p, but Moore does not believe Moore believes p. 
Moore's self-report: I believe p, but I believe Moore does not believe p 
 
Because of the opacity of the belief-context, in the above belief-report, if there is no, so-called, 
coordination between the name appearances 'Moore', at least the second appearance of the name 'Moore' 
and the third appearance of the name 'Moore' are expressions with the same referent but are not 
guaranteed the sameness of referent. This problem is made clearer by considering Moore's self-report. 
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The situation in which this belief-report is made is a case in which, as Moore does not talk about himself 
through the name 'Moore,' it is a case that  
 
(d) Moore: "p, but Moore does not believe p."  
 
In the case of (d), we may feel absurdity, but if we judged that he is not talking about himself, then in 
case of (d), we would not feel Moore's paradoxical absurdity. Rather, it is a reasonable expectation to 
think that Moore talks about another person named “Moore.” 
 Two analyzes can be given for this, as in the case of Perry’s messy shopper. 
 If we analyze de re this belief report, both (b) and (c) indicate that Moore believes in 
contradictions. However, we have Moore's paradoxical absurdity only in cases like (a). Moore's 
paradoxical absurdity in only one of the two cases seems to be because Moore considers one case to be 
about himself, while the other is not. Therefore, the de re analysis does not provide a sufficient analysis 
of this case without appealing to the indexicality. 
If so, what about de dicto analysis? On the de dicto level, it seems that (b) and (c) are 
distinguished unless Moore has a belief such as "I am Moore," and no formal contradiction or conflict 
is found concerning (c) alone. The de dicto analysis, however, does not distinguish between Moore's 
self-reference with the name “Moore” (the case with Moore's belief that I am Moore) from no self-
reference with regard to the same name. If we know that Moore refers himself by the name “Moore,” 
we would also feel Moore's paradoxical absurdity in (d). The de dicto analysis, however, suggests that 
Moore made literally the same assertion in both cases. Therefore, we cannot distinguish between the 
appearance and the absence of Moore's paradoxical absurdity between them. To provide the right 
analysis, we should appeal to the belief such as “I am Moore” where the indexical appears. 
Why then did it seem to have absurd beliefs on one side, but not on the other? On one side, the 
indexical "I" or "he" appeared, while self-reference occurred, but not on the other. The indexical assured 
Moore that the believer is himself and that he believed in himself. Without self-reference, this would 
be the type of case (d), which shows that Moore's paradox does not occur unless it is a special case. As 
for the type of case (d), I shall examine a more clear example of how this type of case may or may not 
present Moore's paradoxical absurdity. Case: 
 
Professor John Perry, who has gained excessive weight as he ages, believes weight 
management is important for many adult illness concerns. On that day, the station filmed 
at Stanford University, and Prof. Perry, who was walking on campus, was filmed without 
a face. The next day, watching TV news covering Stanford University, he sees a passing 
professor (in fact, Perry himself) and thinks, "Huh! That Professor, he does not care about 
weight management." 
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Then John Perry can make the following assertion: 
 
(e) Perry: "Weight management is important, but that professor does not believe weight 
management is important." 
 
The above utterance is clearly an utterance about oneself and seems to have a structure of Moore's 
paradox. However, as long as the assertor considers the subject of the sentence containing "believe" as 
three-personal, rather than first-personal, we do not feel Moore-paradoxical absurdity. In other words, 
“that professor” is co-referring with “John Perry” but not as an expression of self (self-referential 
expression). On the other hand, let us say we know someone who uses third-personal expressions for 
self-reference, such as "Commander was disappointed in you." We will feel Moore-paradoxical 
absurdity when he utters the following sentence,  
 
(f) Commander: "The US–North Korea summit was held, but “commander” does not believe 
it" 
 
thinking that “commander” was used as a self-referential expression rather than an expression for 
another commander or a general term. 
From this observation, Moore's paradox does not seem to occur without self-reference. After 
all, it can be concluded that Moore's paradoxical absurdity occurs if and only if the subject uses the 
expression for self-reference when asserting a type of sentence such as "a proposition, the subject does 
not believe that very proposition."1  
 Moore's paradox in which proper nouns are involved is not intuitively clear, so I haven't 
provided a case where proper nouns are involved. However, this is no obstacle to my discussion. To 
illustrate this, I shall look again into “Jack The Ripper” example:  
 
Suppose John Perry forgot that his old name was Jack the Ripper, and this time it's the 
name tag that says Jack the Ripper, not sugar, that spilled over to the supermarket. He can 
look around and believe that “Jack the Ripper is making a mess,” and at the same time, 
believe that “I am not making a mess.” (p.4) 
 
 
1 To understand my point, it should be clear that self-reference is indispensable to Moore's paradox. Thus, 
Moore's paradox, in which proper nouns are involved, is likely to confuse the discussion because it requires the 
provision of unusual devices such as memory loss. So far, I have not shown that self-reference is indispensable 
for Moore's paradox with examples of proper nouns involved. 
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In that case, Perry further believes that "if anyone knows that they are making a mess, they stop making 
a mess." If so, the following belief report may be possible.  
 
(g) Perry: “Jack the Ripper is making a mess, and Jack The Ripper does not believe that Jack 
the Ripper is making a mess.” 
 
He makes this report, and after we hear it, we feel no absurdity. If there is no self-reference, then we do 
not seem to have Moore-paradoxical absurdity. If there is an absurdity when we hear and feel these 
words, it probably does not come from Moore-paradoxical reasons exactly. This may be absurd because 
Jack the Ripper is himself, although the assertor, Perry himself, did not know it. To illustrate this, 
consider the following two reports: 
 
(h) Perry: "Jack the Ripper is making a mess, and John Perry does not believe Jack the Ripper 
is making a mess." 
(i) Perry: "Jack the Ripper is making a mess, and I don't believe Jack the Ripper is making a 
mess." 
 
(i) is clearly a typical Moore-paradox situation. (h) does not sound absurd at first glance. Suppose we 
know that John Perry considers himself "John Perry" and that he can use it to refer himself. Then, when 
John Perry utters (h), the absurdity of (h) we feel would also be Moore-paradoxical absurdity. What we 
can see here in the differences between these examples is that Moore's paradoxical absurdity relies on 
the presence of self-reference, more than a merely truth-preservative substitution of truth between co-
referring expressions. 
The situation of Moore's paradox at the linguistic level is an example of the failure of truth-
preserving substitution between the co-referring expressions in the belief-context. I admit, there is no 
new opacity puzzle. At the same time, however, the analysis I have presented in this section at least 
shows that self-referring through expression has the indexicality in the assertion-context and belief-
context, which is a crucial element of the absurdity of Moore's paradox. Since Moore's paradox does 
not appear without self-reference, the case of Moore's paradoxical absurdity is a unique case that is a 
failure of truth-preserving substitution only between the indexical expression and its co-referring 
expression. Unlike the Perry-style-Cases, where Cappelen and Dever have already presented the Frege 
Counterpart, in this Moore’s Paradox case, I have found a reason for advocating Indexical Opacity, 
but no reason for advocating General Opacity. I thus conclude, in the case of Moore's paradoxical 
absurdity, there is no Frege Counterpart, such as a failure to replace between co-referring names whose 
absurdity is a problem. 
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In addition, as we have seen, there are cases in which proper nouns in a sentence function as if 
they had the characteristics of an indexical. So I argued that Moore's paradox could occur, at least in 
that case. Although the Indexical does not capture the core of Moore's paradox, the Indexicality still 
captures the core. So the Essential Indexicality, rather than the Essential Indexical, seem to be safe from 
the objection that Moore's paradox still occurs in cases of proper nouns. The question of whether there 
is an Essential Indexical is a matter of language expression, and it is a side issue of whether there is an 
Essential Indexicality. After all, the existence of Essential Indexicality is at the heart of our debate. 
Keeping the Essential Indexicality per se is my ultimate goal, and trying to protect the Essential 
Indexical as a language expression is not my ultimate goal. 
 
5. Closing Remarks 
 
Modest Goal: (…) We try to show that none of the published arguments in favor of 
Essential Indexicality are strong or convincing. (…)  
Ambitious Goal: Prove that perspective and indexicality are philosophically shallow: 
they play no important explanatory roles in philosophy. (Cappelen and Dever 2013, 5) 
 
In the light of their goals, let me summarize my argument in this paper. Since I argue Moore’s paradox 
stands for Essential Indexicality because it occurs only when self-reference appears, for the case of 
Moore’s paradox, I contend that it is not possible to offer the Frege counterpart that Cappelen and Dever 
assert as a counterexample to Perry’s Essential Indexical. So, in this paper, I provide a new argument 
in favor of Essential Indexicality against their first goals and the counterexample of their ultimate goals. 
Nevertheless, they were already skeptic of the existence of epistemological Essential 
Indexicality in their book as the Immunity to Error through Misidentification is powerless. Perhaps, 
they probably would respond to my argument like this: Moore's paradoxical absurdity is also powerless 
as if the IEM is powerless. I shall deal with this possible objection to my counterargument for their 
goals.  
 
Cappelen and Dever argued that there were no phenomena such as Immunity to Error through 
Misidentification (IEM), and then, based on this, they argued that there was no epistemological 
Essential Indexical. In this paper, I present Moore's paradox as a new ground for epistemological 
Essential Indexical. It seems plausible to suppose for them that there are no absurdities in Moore's 
paradox on the lines of their claim that there is no such absurdity by IEM. Also, to support the claim 
that there is no epistemological Essential Indexical, they make two further arguments that IEM cannot 
be the basis for the Essential Indexical (Cappelen and Dever 2013, 139). Introducing these arguments 
will help to construct their possible objections. 
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(i) There is no IEM phenomenon that is philosophically interesting. 
(ii) Even if there is IEM phenomenon, it is not a deep or constructively indexical phenomenon. 
Many non-indexical beliefs are also immune to error through Misidentification  
(iii) There is no plausible explanation for the epistemological status of beliefs that are immune 
to error through misidentification derived from the epistemological status that originates 
in any indexical context. 
 
Based on this, three possible arguments about Moore's paradoxical absurdity can be constructed. 
 
(iv) There is no Moore's paradox that is philosophically interesting. 
(v) Moore's paradox, even if there is, is not a deep or constructively indexical phenomenon. 
Many non-indexical beliefs also cause Moore's paradox. 
(vi) There is no plausible explanation for the epistemological status of Moore's paradoxical 
phenomena derived from the epistemological status underlying any indexical context. 
 
Yet, isn't Moore's paradox obvious? I do not know with assurance what arguments support (iv) are 
possible. Also, I have already argued that claim (v) does not apply to Moore's paradox. Moore's paradox 
does not happen at least without self-reference.  
For (vi), are there deep reasons for not being able to raise the Frege Counterpart on Moore's 
paradox? Richard Moran says that Moore's paradox does not seem to be merely a pragmatic paradox or 
a linguistic phenomenon (Moran 1997, 144). Even if a person does not utter Moore's paradoxical 
sentences, the paradox still seems to arise if he has Moore's paradoxical type of belief (Moran 1997, 
144). So, Moore's paradox leads us to expect that in the context of self-knowledge, there might be 
Essential Indexicality and essential de se attitude, as we have already seen in the analysis of the Paradox.  
 I believe that the Essential Indexicality of Moore's paradox is ultimately based on the Essential 
Indexicality of Self-Knowledge. Consequently, I want to maintain it is possible to epistemologically 
defend the Essential Indexicality of Self-Knowledge based on Moran's theory of self-knowledge, 
regarding self-knowledge not as a matter of discovery but as a matter of self-determination (or self-
constitution). Moran writes: 
 
[W]e can see it[self-knowledge] as a rational requirement on belief, on being a believer, 
that one should have access to what one believes in a way that is radically non-evidential, 
that does not rely on inference from anything inner or outer. (Moran 1997, 143) 
 
 Moore’s Paradox and Essential Indexicality  13 
Though I cannot introduce it in detail here, according to him, our self-knowledge is the result of our 
rational ability to decide what is true. To illustrate that the evidential view is not right, let us suppose 
evidential view is right: what we do to find out what we want to do is to discover internal evidence. If 
so, what is the connection between what we discover and what we do after? It is just a causal 
relationship. In that relationship, we cannot find the very point that I decide my actions. What is more, 
even though I cannot be sure about what will actually happen, it is strange that it is impossible to decide 
what I want to do as in the evidence-discovery-view (Moran 1997, 157). However, if what we need to 
do to know what we want to do is decide whether we do, then the decision and the knowledge about 
what we will do is under my agential power. 
Matthew Boyle, an enthusiastic advocate of Moran, summarizes Moran's claim as that,  
 
I think Moran’s idea—that I can have transparent knowledge of my own beliefs because 
they are expressions of my rational agency. (…) Briefly, the idea would be that, for a 
rational creature, believing P just is being in a condition of actively holding P to be true. 
(Boyle 2011, 235-6) 
 
Though Moran didn't pay attention exactly quotes below, Gareth Evans already dealt with the self-
knowledge in a similar point: 
 
I get myself in a position to answer the question whether I believe that p by putting into 
operation whatever procedure I have for answering the question whether p. (Evans 1982, 
256) 
 
Also, Moran writes:  
 
In the first-person perspective on belief, however, my primary relation is not to the fact 
of having some belief but rather the commitment to its truth and what that requires of me. 
Detaching my relation to a state of belief (mine or another’s) from the commitment to its 
truth is precisely what would allow for discretionary reasons in relation to its production. 
The first-person point of view presumes the absence of such separation, presumes the 
identity of the considerations in favor of the thing believed with the fact of one’s believing 
it. (Moran 2012, 235) 
 
To summarize the citations, I think Moran is making the following claim: The answer to the following 
questions for the agent should be determined at the same time and should be the same.  
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(1) Whether p 
(2) Whether I believe p 
 
So far, by excogitating the contents of these self-commitments, we have seen that self-knowledge is 
essentially indexical and de se.  
 
(3) The agent commits that p. 
(4) The agent commits that he believes that p. 
 
The agent must be convinced that the person who believes that p is himself and not anyone else. If his 
believed object is someone else, he does not have a belief in himself. To reflect this, because we cannot 
remove the indexical “he” as co-referring the agent in (4) above (obviously, its counterpart is “I” in (2)) 
in that sense, the indexical used here can be said to be the Essential Indexical. To make this clearer, I 
shall deal with the relationship between Moore's paradox and the indexicality of self-knowledge. 
According to my analysis of Moran, if we commit p to be true, at the same time, we are in a 
position to believe p. If we are not in such positions by judging that p is true, we will have to allow an 
epistemic agent who commits p to be true but does not believe p. Eventually, it is Moore’s Paradox. 
Through this observation, we see that the absurdity of Moore's paradox is grounded in the absurdity of 
making “self-alienation”2 between one who commits p to be true and one who believes that p. Through 
this, we can explain why Moore's paradoxical absurdity arises: we feel absurd when we know that 
someone is self-alienated.  
Furthermore, to rationally have a belief that p, according to Moran, the agent must have had a 
commitment that p is true. I shall briefly explain why. Let us suppose I have a belief that p. At this time, 
for instance, if someone claims to me through third-person evidence of me that "you don’t believe p," 
will I recant my belief that p? If I withdraw that belief, this recantation shows that I am not very 
confident in myself as a rational epistemic agent. That is, if I do not have a commitment to p, my belief 
that "I believe that p" is too easily recanted.3 
 On the epistemological level, Moore's paradox is inextricably linked to self-reference, which 
confirms that the theory of self-knowledge provided by Moran is corroborated. Clearly, Moore's 
paradoxical absurdity is a matter of self-belief, which manifests itself in the question of self-knowledge. 
As I have argued, since self-knowledge has the Essential Indexicality, Moore's paradox could only occur 
in the case of Essential Indexicality. Provided Moran's theory of self-knowledge is right, the reason why 
the Frege Counterpart cannot be raised in the context of Moore's paradox at the level of philosophy of 
 
2 This word is borrowed from Moran (Moran 1997, 143, 155). 
3 Be careful. I am not saying here that such recantation should not be allowed. 
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language is not just a coincidence but is that the paradox is a phenomenon based on the epistemological 
Essential Indexicality. I would like to leave this as a matter for my further research. 
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